

Tutorial Series on Reverse Mathematics


Denis R. Hirschfeldt — University of Chicago

2017 NZMRI Summer School, Napier, New Zealand

Tutorial Series on Reverse Mathematics

Denis R. Hirschfeldt — University of Chicago

2017 NZMRI Summer School, Napier, New Zealand



Part I: Background

A Bit of Historical Context

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Russell's Paradox

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Russell's Paradox: Let $S = \{A : A \notin A\}$. Is $S \in S$?

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Russell's Paradox: Let $S = \{A : A \notin A\}$. Is $S \in S$?

Crisis in foundations

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Russell's Paradox: Let $S = \{A : A \notin A\}$. Is $S \in S$?

Crisis in foundations

Hilbert's Program: prove the consistency of mathematics via finitistic methods

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Increase in power, but also a loss of intuition

Increased demand for rigor

Cantor's Paradise

Russell's Paradox: Let $S = \{A : A \notin A\}$. Is $S \in S$?

Crisis in foundations

Hilbert's Program: prove the consistency of mathematics via finitistic methods

Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— Jorge Luis Borges

We can still try to understand how much axiomatic power given theorems need.

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

We can still try to understand how much axiomatic power given theorems need.

Fix a weak base axiomatic system B .

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

We can still try to understand how much axiomatic power given theorems need.

Fix a weak base axiomatic system B .

Given a theorem T , we can find an axiomatic system $S \supseteq B$ sufficient to prove T .

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

We can still try to understand how much axiomatic power given theorems need.

Fix a weak base axiomatic system B .

Given a theorem T , we can find an axiomatic system $S \supseteq B$ sufficient to prove T .

If we can then also show that the axioms of S are provable from $B + T$, then we know S is *exactly* what we need to prove T .

*Nada se edifica sobre la piedra, todo sobre la arena,
pero nuestro deber es edificar como si fuera piedra la
arena.*

— *Jorge Luis Borges*

We can still try to understand how much axiomatic power given theorems need.

Fix a weak base axiomatic system B .

Given a theorem T , we can find an axiomatic system $S \supseteq B$ sufficient to prove T .

If we can then also show that the axioms of S are provable from $B + T$, then we know S is *exactly* what we need to prove T .

We can also compare theorems in terms of implication over B .

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{ c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics


Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability


Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1315), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

A Lullian circle



The writing machine at the Grand Academy of Lagado
(*Gulliver's Travels*, 1726)



Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1315), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1315), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Emil du Bois-Reymond's *ignoramus et ignorabimus* (1880) and Hilbert's "*Wir müssen wissen—wir werden wissen.*" (1930)



Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1315), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Emil du Bois-Reymond's *ignoramus et ignorabimus* (1880) and Hilbert's "*Wir müssen wissen—wir werden wissen.*" (1930)

Concrete, algorithmic mathematics $\xrightarrow{19^{\text{th}} \text{c.}}$ Abstract mathematics

Loss of algorithmic content

Increased interest in the notion of computability

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1315), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Emil du Bois-Reymond's *ignoramus et ignorabimus* (1880) and Hilbert's "*Wir müssen wissen—wir werden wissen.*" (1930)

Hilbert's 10th Problem: algorithm to decide whether a given Diophantine equation has a solution

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Examples require a formal notion of computability.

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Examples require a formal notion of computability.

Various proposed definitions by Church, Gödel, Herbrand, Kleene in the 1930's

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Examples require a formal notion of computability.

Various proposed definitions by Church, Gödel, Herbrand, Kleene in the 1930's

Turing's machine-based definition (1936)

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Examples require a formal notion of computability.

Various proposed definitions by Church, Gödel, Herbrand, Kleene in the 1930's

Turing's machine-based definition (1936)

All of these definitions are equivalent.

Despite Hilbertian optimism, not all problems have algorithms.

Examples require a formal notion of computability.

Various proposed definitions by Church, Gödel, Herbrand, Kleene in the 1930's

Turing's machine-based definition (1936)

All of these definitions are equivalent.

Church-Turing Thesis: This definition captures the intuitive notion of "computable".

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Thm (Church; Turing). There is no such algorithm.

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Thm (Church; Turing). There is no such algorithm.

Hilbert's 10th Problem: algorithm to decide whether a given Diophantine equation has a solution

Thm (Davis; Putnam; Robinson; Matiyasevich). There is no such algorithm.

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Thm (Church; Turing). There is no such algorithm.

Hilbert's 10th Problem: algorithm to decide whether a given Diophantine equation has a solution

Thm (Davis; Putnam; Robinson; Matiyasevich). There is no such algorithm.

Many other objects have been shown to be noncomputable.

Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem*: algorithm to decide, given a set of axioms A and a statement σ , whether σ follows from A

Thm (Church; Turing). There is no such algorithm.

Hilbert's 10th Problem: algorithm to decide whether a given Diophantine equation has a solution

Thm (Davis; Putnam; Robinson; Matiyasevich). There is no such algorithm.

Many other objects have been shown to be noncomputable.

Computability theory has tools to compare such objects.

A Bit of Computability Theory

We look at countably infinite objects built out of finite ones, e.g. sets of natural numbers, sets of finite strings, functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, etc.

We look at countably infinite objects built out of finite ones, e.g. sets of natural numbers, sets of finite strings, functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, etc.

Computability for such objects can be
thought of via an informal idea of algorithm;
defined formally using a model such as Turing machines.

We look at countably infinite objects built out of finite ones, e.g. sets of natural numbers, sets of finite strings, functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, etc.

Computability for such objects can be

- thought of via an informal idea of algorithm;
- defined formally using a model such as Turing machines.

We can list all Turing machines (with inputs and outputs in \mathbb{N}), in such a way that we can simulate the computation of the e^{th} machine on input n using a **universal** Turing machine.

We look at countably infinite objects built out of finite ones, e.g. sets of natural numbers, sets of finite strings, functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, etc.

Computability for such objects can be

- thought of via an informal idea of algorithm;
- defined formally using a model such as Turing machines.

We can list all Turing machines (with inputs and outputs in \mathbb{N}), in such a way that we can simulate the computation of the e^{th} machine on input n using a **universal** Turing machine.

A Turing machine may fail to halt on a given input, so this list yields a list Φ_0, Φ_1, \dots of all *partial* computable functions.

We look at countably infinite objects built out of finite ones, e.g. sets of natural numbers, sets of finite strings, functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, etc.

Computability for such objects can be
thought of via an informal idea of algorithm;
defined formally using a model such as Turing machines.

We can list all Turing machines (with inputs and outputs in \mathbb{N}), in such a way that we can simulate the computation of the e^{th} machine on input n using a **universal** Turing machine.

A Turing machine may fail to halt on a given input, so this list yields a list Φ_0, Φ_1, \dots of all *partial* computable functions.

We write $\Phi_e(n)\downarrow$ to mean that Φ_e is defined on n .

The Halting Problem is $\emptyset' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e(n) \downarrow\}$.

The Halting Problem is $\emptyset' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e(n) \downarrow\}$.

Thm (Turing). \emptyset' is not computable.

The Halting Problem is $\emptyset' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e(n) \downarrow\}$.

Thm (Turing). \emptyset' is not computable.

Pf. By **diagonalization**: Suppose that \emptyset' is computable.

Then so is $f(e) = \begin{cases} \Phi_e(e) + 1 & \text{if } \langle e, e \rangle \in \emptyset' \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

Thus $\Phi_e = f$ for some e .

Then $\Phi_e(e) \downarrow = f(e) = \Phi_e(e) + 1$. \square

The Halting Problem is $\emptyset' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e(n) \downarrow\}$.

Thm (Turing). \emptyset' is not computable.

Pf. By **diagonalization**: Suppose that \emptyset' is computable.

Then so is $f(e) = \begin{cases} \Phi_e(e) + 1 & \text{if } \langle e, e \rangle \in \emptyset' \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

Thus $\Phi_e = f$ for some e .

Then $\Phi_e(e) \downarrow = f(e) = \Phi_e(e) + 1$. \square

A similar proof shows that there is no effective list of all total computable functions.

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

So are the sets in the Entscheidungsproblem and in Hilbert's 10th problem.

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

So are the sets in the Entscheidungsproblem and in Hilbert's 10th problem.

A is computable **relative** to B if there is an algorithm for computing A if given access to B .

Can be formalized using Turing machines with oracle tapes.

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

So are the sets in the Entscheidungsproblem and in Hilbert's 10th problem.

A is computable **relative** to B if there is an algorithm for computing A if given access to B .

Can be formalized using Turing machines with oracle tapes.

We write $A \leq_T B$ and say that A is **Turing reducible** to B .

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

So are the sets in the Entscheidungsproblem and in Hilbert's 10th problem.

A is computable **relative** to B if there is an algorithm for computing A if given access to B .

Can be formalized using Turing machines with oracle tapes.

We write $A \leq_T B$ and say that A is **Turing reducible** to B .

If $A \leq_T B$ and $B \leq_T A$ then A and B are **Turing equivalent**.

The resulting equivalence classes are the **Turing degrees**.

\emptyset' is not computable, but it is **computably enumerable (c.e.)**.

So are the sets in the Entscheidungsproblem and in Hilbert's 10th problem.

A is computable **relative** to B if there is an algorithm for computing A if given access to B .

Can be formalized using Turing machines with oracle tapes.

We write $A \leq_T B$ and say that A is **Turing reducible** to B .

If $A \leq_T B$ and $B \leq_T A$ then A and B are **Turing equivalent**.

The resulting equivalence classes are the **Turing degrees**.

The degree of the **join** $A \oplus B = \{2n : n \in A\} \cup \{2n+1 : n \in B\}$ is the least upper bound of the degrees of A and B .

For a c.e. A , define a partial computable f s.t. $f(n) \downarrow$ iff $n \in A$.

\emptyset' can tell whether $f(n) \downarrow$, so A is computable relative to \emptyset' .

For a c.e. A , define a partial computable f s.t. $f(n)\downarrow$ iff $n \in A$.

\emptyset' can tell whether $f(n)\downarrow$, so A is computable relative to \emptyset' .

We say that \emptyset' is a **complete** c.e. set.

For a c.e. A , define a partial computable f s.t. $f(n)\downarrow$ iff $n \in A$.

\emptyset' can tell whether $f(n)\downarrow$, so A is computable relative to \emptyset' .

We say that \emptyset' is a **complete** c.e. set.

The undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem and of Hilbert's 10th problem are proved by encoding \emptyset' .

So the corresponding c.e. sets are also complete, i.e., they are in the same Turing degree as \emptyset' .

For a c.e. A , define a partial computable f s.t. $f(n)\downarrow$ iff $n \in A$.

\emptyset' can tell whether $f(n)\downarrow$, so A is computable relative to \emptyset' .

We say that \emptyset' is a **complete** c.e. set.

The undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem and of Hilbert's 10th problem are proved by encoding \emptyset' .

So the corresponding c.e. sets are also complete, i.e., they are in the same Turing degree as \emptyset' .

Thm (Friedberg; Muchnik). There are noncomputable, incomplete c.e. sets.

There are also non-c.e. sets that are computable relative to \emptyset' , including **co-c.e.** sets but also many others.

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can define the concept of being **c.e. relative to X** .

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can define the concept of being **c.e. relative to X** .

Let $\Phi_0^X, \Phi_1^X, \dots$ be the functions that are partial computable relative to X .

We can define the **Halting Problem relative to X** as

$$X' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e^X(n) \downarrow\}.$$

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can define the concept of being **c.e. relative to X** .

Let $\Phi_0^X, \Phi_1^X, \dots$ be the functions that are partial computable relative to X .

We can define the **Halting Problem relative to X** as $X' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e^X(n) \downarrow\}$.

We call this the **(Turing) jump** of X .

If $X \leq_T Y$ then $X' \leq_T Y'$, but not necessarily vice-versa.

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can define the concept of being **c.e. relative to X** .

Let $\Phi_0^X, \Phi_1^X, \dots$ be the functions that are partial computable relative to X .

We can define the **Halting Problem relative to X** as $X' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e^X(n) \downarrow\}$.

We call this the **(Turing) jump** of X .

If $X \leq_T Y$ then $X' \leq_T Y'$, but not necessarily vice-versa.

Computability-theoretic results tend to relativize.

We can relativize other computability-theoretic concepts.

We can define the concept of being **c.e. relative to X** .

Let $\Phi_0^X, \Phi_1^X, \dots$ be the functions that are partial computable relative to X .

We can define the **Halting Problem relative to X** as $X' = \{\langle e, n \rangle : \Phi_e^X(n) \downarrow\}$.

We call this the **(Turing) jump** of X .

If $X \leq_T Y$ then $X' \leq_T Y'$, but not necessarily vice-versa.

Computability-theoretic results tend to relativize.

E.g., X' is not computable relative to X , and is complete for sets c.e. relative to X .

Part II: Computability-Theoretic Comparison

An Example: Versions of König's Lemma

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

T is **finitely branching** if for each $\sigma \in T$, $|\{n : \sigma n \in T\}| < \infty$.

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

T is **finitely branching** if for each $\sigma \in T$, $|\{n : \sigma n \in T\}| < \infty$.

T is **binary** if it is a subset of $2^{<\omega}$.

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

T is **finitely branching** if for each $\sigma \in T$, $|\{n : \sigma n \in T\}| < \infty$.

T is **binary** if it is a subset of $2^{<\omega}$.

A **path** on T is a $P \in \mathbb{N}^\omega$ s.t. every initial segment of P is in T .

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

T is **finitely branching** if for each $\sigma \in T$, $|\{n : \sigma n \in T\}| < \infty$.

T is **binary** if it is a subset of $2^{<\omega}$.

A **path** on T is a $P \in \mathbb{N}^\omega$ s.t. every initial segment of P is in T .

Put a topology on \mathbb{N}^ω by taking $\{X : \sigma \prec X\}$ as basic open sets.

Then \mathcal{C} is closed iff it is the set of paths on a tree.

A **tree** is a subset T of $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ closed under initial segments.

T is **computable** if there is an algorithm for determining whether a given σ is in T .

T is **finitely branching** if for each $\sigma \in T$, $|\{n : \sigma n \in T\}| < \infty$.

T is **binary** if it is a subset of $2^{<\omega}$.

A **path** on T is a $P \in \mathbb{N}^\omega$ s.t. every initial segment of P is in T .

Put a topology on \mathbb{N}^ω by taking $\{X : \sigma \prec X\}$ as basic open sets.

Then \mathcal{C} is closed iff it is the set of paths on a tree.

Put a measure on 2^ω by letting $\mu(\{X : \sigma \prec X\}) = 2^{-|\sigma|}$.

König's Lemma: Every infinite, finitely branching tree has a path.

Versions of König's Lemma

König's Lemma: Every infinite, finitely branching tree has a path.

Weak König's Lemma: Every infinite binary tree has a path.

König's Lemma: Every infinite, finitely branching tree has a path.

Weak König's Lemma: Every infinite binary tree has a path.

Weak Weak König's Lemma: Every binary tree T s.t.

$$\liminf_n \frac{|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}|}{2^n} > 0$$

has a path.

Versions of König's Lemma

König's Lemma: Every infinite, finitely branching tree has a path.

Weak König's Lemma: Every infinite binary tree has a path.

Weak Weak König's Lemma: Every binary tree T s.t.

$$\liminf_n \frac{|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}|}{2^n} > 0$$

has a path.

Bounded König's Lemma: Every infinite binary tree T s.t.

$$|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$$

for some c has a path.

Versions of König's Lemma

KL: Infinite, finitely branching trees have paths.

WKL: Infinite binary trees have paths.

WWKL: Fat binary trees have paths.

BKL: Skinny infinite binary trees have paths.

Versions of König's Lemma

KL: Infinite, finitely branching trees have paths.

WKL: Infinite binary trees have paths.

WWKL: Fat binary trees have paths.

BKL: Skinny infinite binary trees have paths.

WKL says that 2^ω is compact.

Versions of König's Lemma

KL: Infinite, finitely branching trees have paths.

WKL: Infinite binary trees have paths.

WWKL: Fat binary trees have paths.

BKL: Skinny infinite binary trees have paths.

WKL says that 2^ω is compact.

KL says that certain subspaces of \mathbb{N}^ω are compact, but these subspaces are not as effectively presented.

Versions of König's Lemma

KL: Infinite, finitely branching trees have paths.

WKL: Infinite binary trees have paths.

WWKL: Fat binary trees have paths.

BKL: Skinny infinite binary trees have paths.

WKL says that 2^ω is compact.

KL says that certain subspaces of \mathbb{N}^ω are compact, but these subspaces are not as effectively presented.

WKL: Find an element of a closed set.

WWKL: Find an element of a closed of positive measure.

BKL: Find an element of a finite set.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

We can find τ_n computably.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

We can find τ_n computably.

$P = \lim_n \tau_n$, so T has a computable path.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

We can find τ_n computably.

$P = \lim_n \tau_n$, so T has a computable path.

In fact, every path on T is computable.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

We can find τ_n computably.

$P = \lim_n \tau_n$, so T has a computable path.

In fact, every path on T is computable.

More generally, even if T is not computable, the above procedure is computable *relative to* T .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree s.t.
 $|\{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}| < c$ for all n .

There is a $\sigma \in T$ extended by a unique path P on T .

For each $n > |\sigma|$, there is a unique $\tau_n \succ \sigma$ of length n s.t. T is infinite above τ_n .

We can find τ_n computably.

$P = \lim_n \tau_n$, so T has a computable path.

In fact, every path on T is computable.

More generally, even if T is not computable, the above procedure is computable *relative to* T .

Thus BKL is computably true.

Thm (Kreisel). There is a computable infinite binary tree with no computable path.

Thus WKL is not computably true, and hence neither is KL.

Kreisel's tree can be fat, so WWKL is also not computably true.

Thm (Kreisel). There is a computable infinite binary tree with no computable path.

Thus WKL is not computably true, and hence neither is KL.

Kreisel's tree can be fat, so WWKL is also not computably true.

To build such a tree, we diagonalize against all potential computable paths.

Thm (Kreisel). There is a computable infinite binary tree with no computable path.

Thus WKL is not computably true, and hence neither is KL.

Kreisel's tree can be fat, so WWKL is also not computably true.

To build such a tree, we diagonalize against all potential computable paths.

There is a computable infinite, finitely branching tree T s.t. every path of T computes \emptyset' .

Thm (Kreisel). There is a computable infinite binary tree with no computable path.

Thus WKL is not computably true, and hence neither is KL.

Kreisel's tree can be fat, so WWKL is also not computably true.

To build such a tree, we diagonalize against all potential computable paths.

There is a computable infinite, finitely branching tree T s.t. every path of T computes \emptyset' .

There is a computable infinite, finitely branching tree T with no path computable relative to \emptyset' .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree.

Thm (Kreisel). T has a path $P \leq_T \emptyset'$.

An example is the leftmost path of T .

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree.

Thm (Kreisel). T has a path $P \leq_T \emptyset'$.

An example is the leftmost path of T .

Thm (Shoenfield). T has a path $P <_T \emptyset'$.

Thus WKL is strictly weaker than KL in at least two senses.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree.

Thm (Kreisel). T has a path $P \leq_T \emptyset'$.

An example is the leftmost path of T .

Thm (Shoenfield). T has a path $P <_T \emptyset'$.

Thus WKL is strictly weaker than KL in at least two senses.

But just how much weaker?

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree.

Thm (Kreisel). T has a path $P \leq_T \emptyset'$.

An example is the leftmost path of T .

Thm (Shoenfield). T has a path $P <_T \emptyset'$.

Thus WKL is strictly weaker than KL in at least two senses.

But just how much weaker?

Low Basis Thm (Jockusch and Soare). T has a path P s.t. $P' \leq_T \emptyset'$.

Such a P is called **low**.

Let T be a computable infinite binary tree.

Thm (Kreisel). T has a path $P \leq_T \emptyset'$.

An example is the leftmost path of T .

Thm (Shoenfield). T has a path $P <_T \emptyset'$.

Thus WKL is strictly weaker than KL in at least two senses.

But just how much weaker?

Low Basis Thm (Jockusch and Soare). T has a path P s.t. $P' \leq_T \emptyset'$.

Such a P is called **low**.

This theorem relativizes: If the binary tree T is computable relative to X then T has a path P s.t. $(P \oplus X)' \leq_T X'$.

Computable Entailment

Second-Order Statements

Versions of KL are **second-order** statements, involving quantification over first-order (finite) objects and second-order (countably infinite) objects.

Second-Order Statements

Versions of KL are **second-order** statements, involving quantification over first-order (finite) objects and second-order (countably infinite) objects.

We can encode finite objects as natural numbers: e.g., strings, rationals, finite sets, . . .

We can encode countably infinite objects as sets of natural numbers: e.g., infinite sequences, trees, groups, reals, . . .

Second-Order Statements

Versions of KL are **second-order** statements, involving quantification over first-order (finite) objects and second-order (countably infinite) objects.

We can encode finite objects as natural numbers: e.g., strings, rationals, finite sets, ...

We can encode countably infinite objects as sets of natural numbers: e.g., infinite sequences, trees, groups, reals, ...

So we might encode a $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$ of length n as $2\sigma(0) + 4\sigma(1) + \dots + 2^n\sigma(n-1)$.

Then a tree is just a particular kind of subset of \mathbb{N} .

Thus we can work in **second-order arithmetic**.

Π_2^1 Statements

Statements involving only first-order quantification are called **arithmetic**.

Statements involving only first-order quantification are called **arithmetic**.

Version of KL are of the form

$$\forall X [\Theta(X) \rightarrow \exists Y \Psi(X, Y)],$$

where Θ and Ψ are arithmetic.

Statements involving only first-order quantification are called **arithmetic**.

Version of KL are of the form

$$\forall X [\Theta(X) \rightarrow \exists Y \Psi(X, Y)],$$

where Θ and Ψ are arithmetic.

We can think of such a statement as a problem:

An **instance** is an X s.t. $\Theta(X)$ holds.

A **solution** to X is a Y s.t. $\Psi(X, Y)$ holds.

Statements involving only first-order quantification are called **arithmetic**.

Version of KL are of the form

$$\forall X [\Theta(X) \rightarrow \exists Y \Psi(X, Y)],$$

where Θ and Ψ are arithmetic.

We can think of such a statement as a problem:

An **instance** is an X s.t. $\Theta(X)$ holds.

A **solution** to X is a Y s.t. $\Psi(X, Y)$ holds.

Solving an instance of WKL takes less power than solving an instance of KL.

Statements involving only first-order quantification are called **arithmetic**.

Version of KL are of the form

$$\forall X [\Theta(X) \rightarrow \exists Y \Psi(X, Y)],$$

where Θ and Ψ are arithmetic.

We can think of such a statement as a problem:

An **instance** is an X s.t. $\Theta(X)$ holds.

A **solution** to X is a Y s.t. $\Psi(X, Y)$ holds.

Solving an instance of WKL takes less power than solving an instance of KL.

But what about multiple instances?

A **Turing ideal** is an $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ s.t. if $B_1, \dots, B_n \in \mathcal{I}$ and A is computable relative to B_1, \dots, B_n then $A \in \mathcal{I}$.

A **Turing ideal** is an $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ s.t. if $B_1, \dots, B_n \in \mathcal{I}$ and A is computable relative to B_1, \dots, B_n then $A \in \mathcal{I}$.

A problem P **holds** in \mathcal{I} if for every instance X of P in \mathcal{I} , there is a solution Y to X in \mathcal{I} .

A **Turing ideal** is an $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ s.t. if $B_1, \dots, B_n \in \mathcal{I}$ and A is computable relative to B_1, \dots, B_n then $A \in \mathcal{I}$.

A problem P **holds** in \mathcal{I} if for every instance X of P in \mathcal{I} , there is a solution Y to X in \mathcal{I} .

P **computably entails** Q , written as $P \vDash_c Q$, if Q holds in every Turing ideal in which P holds.

P and Q are **computably equivalent** if they hold in the same Turing ideals.

A **Turing ideal** is an $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ s.t. if $B_1, \dots, B_n \in \mathcal{I}$ and A is computable relative to B_1, \dots, B_n then $A \in \mathcal{I}$.

A problem P **holds** in \mathcal{I} if for every instance X of P in \mathcal{I} , there is a solution Y to X in \mathcal{I} .

P **computably entails** Q , written as $P \vDash_c Q$, if Q holds in every Turing ideal in which P holds.

P and Q are **computably equivalent** if they hold in the same Turing ideals.

A statement Φ of second-order arithmetic **holds** in \mathcal{I} if Φ is true when $\exists X$ and $\forall X$ are replaced by $\exists X \in \mathcal{I}$ and $\forall X \in \mathcal{I}$.

Clearly $KL \vDash_c WKL$ and $WKL \vDash_c WWKL$.

BKL holds in every Turing ideal, so $WWKL \vDash_c BKL$.

Clearly $KL \vDash_c WKL$ and $WKL \vDash_c WWKL$.

BKL holds in every Turing ideal, so $WWKL \vDash_c BKL$.

The computable sets form a Turing ideal \mathcal{I} , and $WWKL$ does not hold in \mathcal{I} , so $BKL \not\vDash_c WWKL$.

Clearly $KL \equiv_c WKL$ and $WKL \equiv_c WWKL$.

BKL holds in every Turing ideal, so $WWKL \equiv_c BKL$.

The computable sets form a Turing ideal \mathcal{I} , and $WWKL$ does not hold in \mathcal{I} , so $BKL \not\equiv_c WWKL$.

Thm (Scott/Jockusch and Soare/Friedman). $WKL \not\equiv_c KL$.

The proof uses the relativized Low Basis Theorem: If the binary tree T is computable relative to X then T has a path P s.t.

$$(P \oplus X)' \leq_T X'.$$

Clearly $KL \vDash_c WKL$ and $WKL \vDash_c WWKL$.

BKL holds in every Turing ideal, so $WWKL \vDash_c BKL$.

The computable sets form a Turing ideal \mathcal{I} , and $WWKL$ does not hold in \mathcal{I} , so $BKL \not\vDash_c WWKL$.

Thm (Scott/Jockusch and Soare/Friedman). $WKL \not\vDash_c KL$.

The proof uses the relativized Low Basis Theorem: If the binary tree T is computable relative to X then T has a path P s.t. $(P \oplus X)' \leq_T X'$.

Thm (Yu and Simpson). $WWKL \not\vDash_c WKL$.

The proof uses the theory of algorithmic randomness.

BKL, WWKL, WKL, and KL represent important complexity levels.

BKL, WWKL, WKL, and KL represent important complexity levels.

Computably equivalent to BKL (i.e., computably true):

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

BKL, WWKL, WKL, and KL represent important complexity levels.

Computationally equivalent to BKL (i.e., computably true):

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

Computationally equivalent to WWKL:

- ▶ the Vitali Covering Theorem
- ▶ the monotone convergence theorem for Lebesgue measure on $[0, 1]$
- ▶ the existence of (relatively) Martin-Löf random sequences
- ▶

Computationally equivalent to WKL:

- ▶ the uniqueness of algebraic closures for fields
- ▶ the existence of prime ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic
- ▶ the Extreme Value Theorem
- ▶ Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem
- ⋮


Computationally equivalent to WKL:

- ▶ the uniqueness of algebraic closures for fields
- ▶ the existence of prime ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic
- ▶ the Extreme Value Theorem
- ▶ Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem
- ⋮

Computationally equivalent to KL:

- ▶ the existence of maximal ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the existence of bases for vector spaces
- ▶ the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem
- ▶ the existence of the Turing jump
- ⋮

Part III: Reverse Mathematics



Second-Order Arithmetic and RCA_0

We work in a language with number variables, set variables, and symbols $0, 1, S, <, +, \cdot, \in$.

We work in a language with number variables, set variables, and symbols $0, 1, S, <, +, \cdot, \in$.

Again we encode finite objects as natural numbers and infinite objects as sets of natural numbers.

We work in a language with number variables, set variables, and symbols $0, 1, S, <, +, \cdot, \in$.

Again we encode finite objects as natural numbers and infinite objects as sets of natural numbers.

Reverse Mathematics: fix a weak base system and calibrate the strength of principles by considering implications over this system.

Often in terms of a few subsystems of second-order arithmetic.

Full second-order arithmetic consists of

- ▶ axioms for a discrete ordered commutative semiring
- ▶ comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all formulas φ s.t. X is not free in φ

- ▶ induction:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all formulas φ

Full second-order arithmetic consists of

- ▶ axioms for a discrete ordered commutative semiring
- ▶ **comprehension:**

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all formulas φ s.t. X is not free in φ

- ▶ **induction:**

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all formulas φ

We obtain subsystems by limiting comprehension and induction.

A **bounded quantifier** is one of the form $\forall x < t$ or $\exists x < t$.

A **bounded-quantifier formula** is an arithmetic formula in which all quantifiers are bounded.

A **bounded quantifier** is one of the form $\forall x < t$ or $\exists x < t$.

A **bounded-quantifier formula** is an arithmetic formula in which all quantifiers are bounded.

A Σ_n^0 **formula** is one of the form

$$\exists x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 \forall x_4 \cdots Qx_n \varphi,$$

where φ is a bounded-quantifier formula and Q is \exists if n is odd and \forall if n is even.

A **bounded quantifier** is one of the form $\forall x < t$ or $\exists x < t$.

A **bounded-quantifier formula** is an arithmetic formula in which all quantifiers are bounded.

A Σ_n^0 **formula** is one of the form

$$\exists x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 \forall x_4 \cdots Qx_n \varphi,$$

where φ is a bounded-quantifier formula and Q is \exists if n is odd and \forall if n is even.

A Π_n^0 **formula** is one of the form

$$\forall x_1 \exists x_2 \forall x_3 \exists x_4 \cdots Qx_n \varphi,$$

where φ is a bounded-quantifier formula and Q is \forall if n is odd and \exists if n is even.

A **bounded quantifier** is one of the form $\forall x < t$ or $\exists x < t$.

A **bounded-quantifier formula** is an arithmetic formula in which all quantifiers are bounded.

A Σ_n^0 **formula** is one of the form

$$\exists x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 \forall x_4 \cdots Qx_n \varphi,$$

where φ is a bounded-quantifier formula and Q is \exists if n is odd and \forall if n is even.

A Π_n^0 **formula** is one of the form

$$\forall x_1 \exists x_2 \forall x_3 \exists x_4 \cdots Qx_n \varphi,$$

where φ is a bounded-quantifier formula and Q is \forall if n is odd and \exists if n is even.

These formulas can have free variables.

RCA_0 is obtained by restricting:

- ▶ comprehension to Δ_1^0 -comprehension:

$$\forall n [\varphi(n) \leftrightarrow \psi(n)] \rightarrow \exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all φ, ψ s.t. φ is Σ_1^0 and ψ is Π_1^0 , and X is not free in φ

- ▶ induction to Σ_1^0 -induction:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all Σ_1^0 formulas φ

RCA_0 is obtained by restricting:

- ▶ comprehension to Δ_1^0 -comprehension:

$$\forall n [\varphi(n) \leftrightarrow \psi(n)] \rightarrow \exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all φ, ψ s.t. φ is Σ_1^0 and ψ is Π_1^0 , and X is not free in φ

- ▶ induction to Σ_1^0 -induction:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all Σ_1^0 formulas φ

This choice of base system creates a tight connection between this approach and computable entailment.

Provable in RCA_0

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶ \vdots

Provable in RCA_0

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

Provably equivalent to WWKL over RCA_0 :

- ▶ the Vitali Covering Theorem
- ▶ the monotone convergence theorem for Lebesgue measure on $[0, 1]$
- ▶ the existence of (relatively) Martin-Löf random sequences
- ▶

Provably equivalent to WKL over RCA_0 :

- ▶ the uniqueness of algebraic closures for fields
- ▶ the existence of prime ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic
- ▶ the Extreme Value Theorem
- ▶ Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem
- ▶ \vdots

Provably equivalent to KL over RCA_0 :

- ▶ the existence of maximal ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the existence of bases for vector spaces
- ▶ the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem
- ▶ the existence of the Turing jump
- ▶ \vdots

Computability and Definability

A **first-order formula** is one with no set variables.

$A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is **defined** in \mathbb{N} by a first-order formula $\varphi(y)$ if: $k \in A$ iff $\varphi(k)$ holds in \mathbb{N} .

A **first-order formula** is one with no set variables.

A $\subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is **defined** in \mathbb{N} by a first-order formula $\varphi(y)$ if: $k \in A$ iff $\varphi(k)$ holds in \mathbb{N} .

A set is Σ_n^0 if it is defined in \mathbb{N} by some Σ_n^0 first-order formula.

A set is Π_n^0 if it is defined in \mathbb{N} by some Π_n^0 first-order formula.

A set is Δ_n^0 if it is both Σ_n^0 and Π_n^0 .

A set is **arithmetic** if it is in one of these classes.

The Arithmetic Hierarchy



The Arithmetic Hierarchy



Thm (Kleene). A is Σ_1^0 iff A is c.e. Thus A is Δ_1^0 iff A is computable.



Thm (Kleene). A is Σ_1^0 iff A is c.e. Thus A is Δ_1^0 iff A is computable.

Recall that Z' is the Halting Problem relative to Z .

Define $X^{(n)}$ as follows: $X^{(0)} = X$ and $X^{(n+1)} = (X^{(n)})'$.



Thm (Kleene). A is Σ_1^0 iff A is c.e. Thus A is Δ_1^0 iff A is computable.

Recall that Z' is the Halting Problem relative to Z .

Define $X^{(n)}$ as follows: $X^{(0)} = X$ and $X^{(n+1)} = (X^{(n)})'$.

Thm (Post). A set is Σ_{n+1}^0 iff it is c.e. relative to $\emptyset^{(n)}$, and is Δ_{n+1}^0 iff it is computable relative to $\emptyset^{(n)}$.

All of this can be relativized to any $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}$:

Relativizing the Arithmetic Hierarchy

All of this can be relativized to any $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}$:

Consider arithmetic formulas with one free set variable X .

$A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is **defined** in (\mathbb{N}, S) by $\varphi(y, X)$ if: $k \in A$ iff $\varphi(k, S)$ holds in \mathbb{N} .

Relativizing the Arithmetic Hierarchy

All of this can be relativized to any $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}$:

Consider arithmetic formulas with one free set variable X .

$A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is **defined** in (\mathbb{N}, S) by $\varphi(y, X)$ if: $k \in A$ iff $\varphi(k, S)$ holds in \mathbb{N} .

A set is **Σ_n^0 relative to S** if it is defined in (\mathbb{N}, S) by some Σ_n^0 formula.

A set is **Π_n^0 relative to S** if it is defined in (\mathbb{N}, S) by some Π_n^0 formula.

A set is **Δ_n^0 relative to S** if it is both Σ_n^0 and Π_n^0 relative to S .

Relativizing the Arithmetic Hierarchy

All of this can be relativized to any $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}$:

Consider arithmetic formulas with one free set variable X .

$A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is **defined** in (\mathbb{N}, S) by $\varphi(y, X)$ if: $k \in A$ iff $\varphi(k, S)$ holds in \mathbb{N} .

A set is **Σ_n^0 relative to S** if it is defined in (\mathbb{N}, S) by some Σ_n^0 formula.

A set is **Π_n^0 relative to S** if it is defined in (\mathbb{N}, S) by some Π_n^0 formula.

A set is **Δ_n^0 relative to S** if it is both Σ_n^0 and Π_n^0 relative to S .

Post's Theorem holds in relativized form.

In particular, A is **Δ_1^0 relative to S** iff A is computable relative to S .

Recall that RCA₀ is obtained by restricting:

- ▶ comprehension to Δ_1^0 -comprehension:

$$\forall n [\varphi(n) \leftrightarrow \psi(n)] \rightarrow \exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all φ, ψ s.t. φ is Σ_1^0 and ψ is Π_1^0 , and X is not free in φ

- ▶ induction to Σ_1^0 -induction:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all Σ_1^0 formulas φ

Recall that RCA₀ is obtained by restricting:

- ▶ comprehension to Δ_1^0 -comprehension:

$$\forall n [\varphi(n) \leftrightarrow \psi(n)] \rightarrow \exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all φ, ψ s.t. φ is Σ_1^0 and ψ is Π_1^0 , and X is not free in φ

- ▶ induction to Σ_1^0 -induction:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall n [\varphi(n) \rightarrow \varphi(n+1)]) \rightarrow \forall n \varphi(n)$$

for all Σ_1^0 formulas φ

Δ_1^0 -comprehension is (relative) computable comprehension.

Indeed, RCA stands for Recursive Comprehension Axiom.

A model in the language of second-order arithmetic consists of a first-order part $\mathcal{N} = (N; 0_N, 1_N, S_N, <_N, +_N, \cdot_N)$ and a second-order part $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^N$.

A model in the language of second-order arithmetic consists of a first-order part $\mathcal{N} = (N; 0_N, 1_N, S_N, <_N, +_N, \cdot_N)$ and a second-order part $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^N$.

If \mathcal{N} is the standard natural numbers, we call this an ω -model and identify it with \mathcal{S} .

A model in the language of second-order arithmetic consists of a first-order part $\mathcal{N} = (N; 0_N, 1_N, S_N, <_N, +_N, \cdot_N)$ and a second-order part $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^N$.

If \mathcal{N} is the standard natural numbers, we call this an ω -model and identify it with \mathcal{S} .

Thm (Friedman). \mathcal{S} is an ω -model of RCA_0 iff \mathcal{S} is a Turing ideal.

Cor. If $\text{RCA}_0 + P \vdash Q$ then $P \vDash_c Q$.

A model in the language of second-order arithmetic consists of a first-order part $\mathcal{N} = (N; 0_N, 1_N, S_N, <_N, +_N, \cdot_N)$ and a second-order part $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^N$.

If \mathcal{N} is the standard natural numbers, we call this an ω -model and identify it with \mathcal{S} .

Thm (Friedman). \mathcal{S} is an ω -model of RCA_0 iff \mathcal{S} is a Turing ideal.

Cor. If $\text{RCA}_0 + P \vdash Q$ then $P \vDash_c Q$.

The converse does not always hold because non- ω -models of RCA_0 exist, but it often does.

The Reverse-Mathematical Universe

Several theorems can be proved in RCA_0 , e.g. many basic properties of the natural numbers and the reals, as well as

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

Several theorems can be proved in RCA_0 , e.g. many basic properties of the natural numbers and the reals, as well as

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

But the computable sets form an ω -model of RCA_0 , so theorems that are not computably true cannot be proved in RCA_0 .

Several theorems can be proved in RCA_0 , e.g. many basic properties of the natural numbers and the reals, as well as

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

But the computable sets form an ω -model of RCA_0 , so theorems that are not computably true cannot be proved in RCA_0 .

Limited induction also plays a role.

Several theorems can be proved in RCA_0 , e.g. many basic properties of the natural numbers and the reals, as well as

- ▶ the existence of algebraic closures of fields
- ▶ Gödel's Completeness Theorem for theories
- ▶ the Intermediate Value Theorem
- ▶ the Tietze Extension Theorem for complete separable metric spaces
- ▶

But the computable sets form an ω -model of RCA_0 , so theorems that are not computably true cannot be proved in RCA_0 .

Limited induction also plays a role.

Thm (Yokoyama). BKL is not provable in RCA_0 .

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 implies arithmetic induction.

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 implies arithmetic induction.

A Turing ideal is an ω -model of ACA_0 iff it is closed under jumps.

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 implies arithmetic induction.

A Turing ideal is an ω -model of ACA_0 iff it is closed under jumps.

$RCA_0 + \Sigma_1^0$ -comprehension implies ACA_0 .

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 implies arithmetic induction.

A Turing ideal is an ω -model of ACA_0 iff it is closed under jumps.

$RCA_0 + \Sigma_1^0$ -comprehension implies ACA_0 .

KL is equivalent to ACA_0 over RCA_0 .

ACA_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic comprehension:

$$\exists X \forall n [n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi(n)]$$

for all arithmetic φ s.t. X is not free in φ

ACA_0 implies arithmetic induction.

A Turing ideal is an ω -model of ACA_0 iff it is closed under jumps.

$RCA_0 + \Sigma_1^0$ -comprehension implies ACA_0 .

KL is equivalent to ACA_0 over RCA_0 . So are

- ▶ the existence of maximal ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the existence of bases for vector spaces
- ▶ the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem
- ▶ the existence of the Turing jump
- ⋮

WKL_0 : RCA_0 + Weak König's Lemma

WKL_0 : RCA_0 + Weak König's Lemma

WKL_0 is **arithmetically conservative** over RCA_0 , i.e., if WKL_0 proves an arithmetic statement, then so does RCA_0 .

So WKL_0 has the same amount of induction as RCA_0 .

WKL₀: RCA₀ + Weak König's Lemma

WKL₀ is **arithmetically conservative** over RCA₀, i.e., if WKL₀ proves an arithmetic statement, then so does RCA₀.

So WKL₀ has the same amount of induction as RCA₀.

ω -models of WKL₀ are also known as **Scott sets**.

WKL₀: RCA₀ + Weak König's Lemma

WKL₀ is **arithmetically conservative** over RCA₀, i.e., if WKL₀ proves an arithmetic statement, then so does RCA₀.

So WKL₀ has the same amount of induction as RCA₀.

ω -models of WKL₀ are also known as **Scott sets**.

Equivalents of WKL₀

- ▶ the uniqueness of algebraic closures for fields
- ▶ the existence of prime ideals for commutative rings
- ▶ the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic
- ▶ the Extreme Value Theorem
- ▶ Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem
- ▶

WWKL₀: RCA₀ + Weak Weak König's Lemma

Equivalents of WWKL₀:

- ▶ the Vitali Covering Theorem
- ▶ the monotone convergence theorem for Lebesgue measure on $[0, 1]$
- ▶ the existence of (relatively) Martin-Löf random sequences
- ⋮

ATR_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic transfinite recursion

ATR_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic transfinite recursion

Equivalents of ATR_0

- ▶ comparability of well-orderings
- ▶ Ulm's Theorem on Abelian p -groups
- ▶ the Perfect Set Theorem
- ⋮

ATR_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic transfinite recursion

Equivalents of ATR_0

- ▶ comparability of well-orderings
- ▶ Ulm's Theorem on Abelian p -groups
- ▶ the Perfect Set Theorem
- ⋮

Π_1^1 - CA_0 : RCA_0 + Π_1^1 -comprehension

A Π_1^1 formula is one of the form $\forall X \varphi$, where φ is arithmetic.

ATR_0 : RCA_0 + arithmetic transfinite recursion

Equivalents of ATR_0

- ▶ comparability of well-orderings
- ▶ Ulm's Theorem on Abelian p -groups
- ▶ the Perfect Set Theorem
- ⋮

Π_1^1 - CA_0 : RCA_0 + Π_1^1 -comprehension

A Π_1^1 formula is one of the form $\forall X \varphi$, where φ is arithmetic.

Equivalents of Π_1^1 - CA_0

- ▶ every countable Abelian group is the direct sum of a divisible group and a reduced group
- ▶ the Cantor-Bendixson Theorem
- ⋮

$\Pi_1^1\text{-CA}_0$



ATR_0



ACA_0



WKL_0



WWKL_0



RCA_0

$[X]^n$ is the set of n -element subsets of X .

A k -coloring of $[X]^n$ is a map $c : [X]^n \rightarrow k$.

A set $H \subseteq X$ is **homogeneous** for c if $|c([H]^n)| = 1$.

Ramsey's Theorem for n -tuples and k colors (RT_k^n): Every k -coloring of $[\mathbb{N}]^n$ has an infinite homogeneous set.

$[X]^n$ is the set of n -element subsets of X .

A k -coloring of $[X]^n$ is a map $c : [X]^n \rightarrow k$.

A set $H \subseteq X$ is **homogeneous** for c if $|c([H]^n)| = 1$.

Ramsey's Theorem for n -tuples and k colors (RT_k^n): Every k -coloring of $[\mathbb{N}]^n$ has an infinite homogeneous set.

For $j, k \geq 2$, RT_j^n and RT_k^n are equivalent over RCA_0 .

$[X]^n$ is the set of n -element subsets of X .

A k -coloring of $[X]^n$ is a map $c : [X]^n \rightarrow k$.

A set $H \subseteq X$ is **homogeneous** for c if $|c([H]^n)| = 1$.

Ramsey's Theorem for n -tuples and k colors (RT_k^n): Every k -coloring of $[\mathbb{N}]^n$ has an infinite homogeneous set.

For $j, k \geq 2$, RT_j^n and RT_k^n are equivalent over RCA_0 .

$RT_{<\infty}^n$ is $\forall k RT_k^n$ and RT is $\forall n \forall k RT_k^n$.

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Seetapun). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Seetapun). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Hirst). $\text{WKL}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_2^2$.

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Seetapun). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Hirst). $\text{WKL}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_2^2$.

Thm (Liu). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{WWKL}_0$.

The Reverse Mathematics of Ramsey's Theorem

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Seetapun). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Hirst). $\text{WKL}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_2^2$.

Thm (Liu). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{WWKL}_0$.

$\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_k^1$ for any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, but:

Thm (Hirst). $\text{RCA}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_{<\infty}^1$.

The Reverse Mathematics of Ramsey's Theorem

Thm (Jockusch/Simpson). For $n \geq 3$, $\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_2^n \leftrightarrow \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Seetapun). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{ACA}_0$.

Thm (Hirst). $\text{WKL}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_2^2$.

Thm (Liu). $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{RT}_2^2 \not\vdash \text{WWKL}_0$.

$\text{RCA}_0 \vdash \text{RT}_k^1$ for any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, but:

Thm (Hirst). $\text{RCA}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}_{<\infty}^1$.

Thm (Jockusch). $\text{ACA}_0 \not\vdash \text{RT}$.

Ascending / Descending Sequence Principle (ADS): Every infinite linear order has an infinite ascending or descending sequence.

Ascending / Descending Sequence Principle (ADS): Every infinite linear order has an infinite ascending or descending sequence.

Chain / Antichain Principle (CAC): Every infinite partial order has an infinite chain or antichain.

Ascending / Descending Sequence Principle (ADS): Every infinite linear order has an infinite ascending or descending sequence.

Chain / Antichain Principle (CAC): Every infinite partial order has an infinite chain or antichain.


Atomic Model Theorem (AMT): Every complete atomic theory has an atomic model.

Ascending / Descending Sequence Principle (ADS): Every infinite linear order has an infinite ascending or descending sequence.

Chain / Antichain Principle (CAC): Every infinite partial order has an infinite chain or antichain.


Atomic Model Theorem (AMT): Every complete atomic theory has an atomic model.

Existence of Diagonally Nonrecursive Functions (DNR): For every X , there is a function f s.t. $f(e) \neq \Phi_e^X(e)$ for all e .



Combined results of Yu and Simpson; Giusto and Simpson; Ambos-Spies, Kjos-Hanssen, Lempp, and Slaman; Hirschfeldt and Shore; Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, Kjos-Hanssen, Lempp, and Slaman; Hirschfeldt, Shore, and Slaman; Liu; and Lerman, Solomon, and Towsner.

A Larger Part of the Universe Between RCA_0 and ACA_0



Tutorial Series on Reverse Mathematics

Denis R. Hirschfeldt — University of Chicago

2017 NZMRI Summer School, Napier, New Zealand

